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ABSTRACT
The presence of foreign multinational enterprises may benefit local economies. In particular, highly
productive foreign-owned firms may promote technological catch-up of local firms. Such channel
of spillovers is defined as "Veblen-Geschenkron" effect of Foreign Direct Investments and is
analyzed in this article. Rather than the overall density of foreign-owned plants in a region or sector,
it  is  their  productivity  advantage  that  determines  the  positive  effect  on  domestic  firms  in
geographical and technological proximity. We test this hypothesis using new firm-level data for
German and Italian manufacturing firms during the 90's. We find evidence of a significant Veblen-
Gerschenkron effect which is robust to different ways of measuring total factor productivity (TFP)
of firms and to different empirical specifications.
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Do foreign direct investments (FDI) beneﬁtd o m e s t i cﬁrms of the host country? If they do, what
are the channels of these eﬀects? These long standing and important questions have attracted
much interest among economists. On the theoretical ground FDI may help or harm domestic
ﬁrms depending on the intensity of diﬀerent eﬀects. Ultimately the net eﬀect of FDI has to be
evaluated empirically, and recent empirical studies have found eﬀects ranging from positive to
negative, depending on the focus, the data and the method used1. This article contributes another
piece of evidence to this issue by focussing on a potentially important (but somewhat neglected)
determinant of spillovers from FDI to domestic ﬁrms2, namely the productive advantage of foreign
ﬁrms over domestic ﬁrms within a sector and region.
According to Blomström et al. (2001) "foreign investors make available (directly or indirectly)
appropriable technology to host country businesses. Appropriable technology should be viewed broadly
as any tangible or intangible resource that can generate economic rent for host country ﬁrms, ...
by improving total factor productivity." Technological spillovers, therefore, should depend on the
technological advantage of the foreign ﬁrms and on their geographical proximity to the domestic
ﬁrms. Hence, our variable of interest will be the productivity advantage of foreign-owned ﬁrms over
domestic ﬁrms in a sector-region. Since the work of Caves (1974) economists have focussed their
a t t e n t i o no nt h econcentration of foreign-owned ﬁrms (measured as the share of FDI capital or share
of FDI workers) within a sector and/or a region as the source (and proxy) of potential spillovers3.
Recently, however, Aitken and Harrison (1999) have shown that properly controlling for unobserved
region-speciﬁce ﬀects eliminates most of the eﬀect of FDI density on domestic ﬁrms’ productivity.
This may occur because some local characteristics that attract FDI4 (such as the presence of high-
quality labor force, large local markets, good infrastructures and good administration) also enhance
1Advocates of a positive role of FDI through technological transfer are Findlay (1978), Das (1987), and Wang and
Blomström (1992). Rodriguez-Clare (1993) and Markusen and Venables (1999) argue that they beneﬁtl o c a ls u p p l i e r s
and local consumers. Fosfuri et al. (2001), and Glass and Saggi (1998, 2002) document that they could increase the
human capital of the local labor force. On the other hand, FDI could out-compete local ﬁrms forcing them out of
production without employing local labor because of skill mis-match. This is argued in Aitken and Harrison (1999).
2For a survey of the literature see Blomström and Kokko (1998). An interesting meta-analysis of the diﬀerent
research results is Görg and Strobl (2001).
3There have been some studies aimed at quantifying some important channels of knowledge diﬀusion via FDI.
Branstetter (2001) uses patent citation data while Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) rely on survey data. These studies,
however, address speciﬁc channels of spillovers rather than their overall impact on productivity.
4See, for example, Shannon and Zeile (1999) for the US and Stirböck (2001) for Europe.
2the productivity of domestic ﬁrms generating a spurious correlation between the two variables. Once
these factors are properly controlled for, no correlation survives.
This result, however, does not necessarily imply zero spillovers from FDI. Instead the density
of FDI may not be the right source of (and proxy for) spillovers. The productivity advantage of
foreign ﬁrms is potentially a more important source of spillovers. While the largest concentration
of foreign ﬁrms occurs, normally, in regions and sectors where domestic ﬁrms are already highly
productive, the largest eﬀect of foreign ﬁrms on domestic ones could be in backward regions, where
concentration of FDI is small, but their eﬀect is large as the scope for technological catch-up is
large. The operating of this mechanism is named, extending an early intuition by Veblen (1915)
and Gerschenkron (1952), the "Veblen-Gerschenkron" eﬀect.
The original hypothesis, formalized by Findlay (1978), states that technologically disadvantaged
regions are more likely to beneﬁt from spillovers of FDI and may experience, as a consequence,
stronger productivity growth relative to advanced regions. The hypothesis tested in this article,
using a new dataset of domestic and foreign-owned manufacturing ﬁr m si nI t a l ya n dG e r m a n y
for the period 1993-1999, is that the productivity gap between domestic ﬁrms and foreign-owned
ﬁrms (in the same sector and region) is an important determinant of domestic ﬁrms’ productivity
growth. The positive eﬀect of the productivity gap on subsequent productivity growth of domestic
ﬁrms will be referred to as Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect. On one hand some recent studies (Haddad
and Harrison, 1993; Kokko, 1994; Sjöholm, 1999; Castellani and Zanfei, 2003) have emphasized
beneﬁcial eﬀects from FDI’s on domestic ﬁrms due to intra-industry technology spillovers and
subsequent catch-up. On the other hand, studies on the diﬀusion of technological knowledge based
on patent and innovation data (Jaﬀe et al. 1993; Audretsch and Feldman 1996; Peri 2004) have
emphasized the high degree of localization of these ﬂows. Our analysis is the ﬁrst to combine the
regional dimension of spillovers from FDI with the importance of the productivity-gap in generating
them. Such a method allows us to identify the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect while controlling for
sector-speciﬁc determinants of spillovers.
A second novel contribution of our study is the computation and use of as many as ﬁve mea-
sures of total factor productivity at the ﬁrm level, each based on a diﬀerent method and diﬀerent
assumptions. As measures of total factor productivity are always indirect, i.e. based on the calcu-
lation of a "residual" from the production function, they can be polluted by systematic unobserved
3errors. In particular, our measures of ﬁrm-level TFP address three important problems namely
endogeneity of foreign ownership, unobserved heterogeneity of ﬁrms and selection in the sample.
Each one of the methods used is more appropriate in addressing some rather than others among
these issues. The fact that using any of our TFP measures we ﬁnd robust and similar estimates of
the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect substantially reduces our concerns for spurious results.
Finally our paper, diﬀerently from others, focuses on the interesting case of Germany, after
reuniﬁcation vis-a-vis the problematic Italian case of long-standing regional disparities as host-
countries for FDI’s. Our new dataset contains geographic identiﬁe r st h a ta l l o wu st ol o c a t eﬁrms
within one of 103 Provinces, for Italian data, and within one of 16 Regions (Bundeslanders) for
German data. Italy and Germany have well-known issues of uneven regional development and the
cross-sectional variation of productivity across ﬁrms is large. Our study exploits these diﬀerences
and provides some evidence on the role of foreign investments in promoting productivity catch-up
in less developed regions. In particular, Germany is a very interesting case-study as the uniﬁcation
and subsequent inﬂow of ﬁrms from Western Europe put eastern ﬁrms in touch with new tech-
nologies after ﬁfty years of isolation. East German ﬁrms after the uniﬁcation exhibited substantial
technological backwardness when a sudden inﬂow of western ﬁrms occurred, generating the ideal
conditions for a strong Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect.
Our estimates show the presence of a positive and signiﬁcant Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect using
each one of our measures of productivity. Such eﬀect is large and of similar magnitude for German
and Italian ﬁrms. We interpret this as evidence that the presence of highly productive FDI (con-
sidered as exogenous to domestic ﬁrms) has a stimulating eﬀect on productivity growth of local
ﬁrms.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our empirical model and the
estimation strategy. Section 4 describes the data for Germany and Italy, Section 5 presents the
estimates, with particular emphasis on the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect. Section 6 concludes the
article.
42 TFP dynamics
We allow total factor productivity (TFP) of sector s in year t to follow a (deterministic or stochastic)
growth path that depends on structural determinants that may vary by sector and year. Calling
Ai,r,s,t the (logged) diﬀerence between ﬁrm i0s TFP and the average TFP in sector s and year t,
we can describe the dynamics of this variable as follows:




r,s,t − Ai,r,s,t)+β3FDIdensityr,s,t + εit. (1)
Ai,r,s,t+1 depends on its lagged level Ai,r,s,t and on two other factors. One, FDIdensityr,s,t, is the
concentration of foreign owned ﬁrms in the same sector and region and is the classic term included
to capture spillovers from FDI. The variable FDIdensityr,s,t, is measured as the share of workers





is a measure of the technological (TFP) advantage of the foreign-owned ﬁrms on local domestic
ﬁrms. In particular it is measured as the diﬀerence between the TFP of the domestic ﬁrm i and
the average TFP of foreign ﬁrms in the same region r and sector s for year t. As discussed above,
this term captures the scope for productive catch-up of domestic ﬁrms assuming that they have an
adequate absorptive capacity5 and that geographycal proximity enhances spillovers. Notice that if
there are no localized spillovers but only an homogeneous externality on all ﬁrms in the sector, the
regional gap variable will have no eﬀect as we control for sector-time dummies.
Equation (1) is a dynamic version of a very common speciﬁcation used (e.g. by Aitken and
Harrison, 1999) to analyze the eﬀect of FDI on domestic ﬁrms’ productivity. The relevant diﬀerences
are the dynamic setting, more appropriate to detect eﬀects that materialize with a delay and the
inclusion of the term capturing the technological advantage of the foreign-owned ﬁrms operating in
region r and sector s6.
Several assumptions may justify the presence of this term in equation (1). Domestic ﬁrms
may come in contact with other technologies randomly in a learning process. The geographical
proximity of technologies used by foreign ﬁrms and their relative quality both inﬂuence positively
5For countries with low level of human capital a measure of average local schooling could proxy their absorptive
capacity (see, for example, Keller 1996, Glass and Saggi, 1998, Kinoshita 2001). Germany and Italy guarantee
adequate levels of literacy and we assume equal absorptive capacity across provinces for a given technological gap.
6The theoretical foundation for the dynamic speciﬁcation can be found in Findlay (1978).
5t h el e a r n i n gr a t eo fad o m e s t i cﬁrm. If we think, for instance, that workers from a domestic ﬁrm
exchange ideas randomly with workers of foreign-owned ﬁrms then the frequency of the exchanges
is positively aﬀected by geographic proximity (hence the choice of regional focus) while the amount
of knowledge exchanged depends on the technological gap (hence the inclusion of the productivity
gap). This is why highly productive FDI in the same region and sector may aﬀect domestic ﬁrm’s
productivity. Alternatively, technology from foreign owned ﬁrms may be a local public good.
Then, the localized diﬀu s i o no ft e c h n o l o g y( J a ﬀe et al. 1993) and higher quality of such technology
(average productivity of FDI’s) result in a localized Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect7. While it can be
hard to distinguish between speciﬁc mechanisms, here we need only identify the overall eﬀect of
the "local productivity gap" and its empirical relevance for productivity growth of domestic ﬁrms.
Considering the productivity advantage of foreign-owned ﬁrms as exogenous we can estimate the
above equation using dynamic panel methods (such as those proposed by Arellano and Bond, 1991,
or Blundell and Bond, 1998). The coeﬃcient β2 captures the strength of the Veblen-Gerschenkron
eﬀect (which is the focus of our study) while the coeﬃcient β3 measures the importance of FDI
concentration. As we control for lagged productivity, the regression also provides information on the
conditional convergence behavior of ﬁrm’s productivities to a common sector-speciﬁc growth path.
The condition for convergence (stationarity of the Ai,r,s,t series) is that the coeﬃcient on lagged
productivity (β1− β2) is smaller than one. In the empirical analysis we will test for stationariety
of Ai,r,s,t and we will check that the estimates of (β1− β2) are signiﬁcantly less than one. Finally,




r,s,t − Ai,r,s,t) the
"Productivity Gap".
Equation (1) has several potential advantages relative to the standard approach to FDI spillovers.
First, factors that vary with sector and time are fully absorbed by the deﬁnition of Ai,r,s,t that cap-
tures only the productivity diﬀerence of a ﬁrm from the sector-time average. Second, regional
factors that aﬀect TFP levels of both domestic and foreign ﬁrms do not bias the estimates of β2
because the "Productivity Gap" variable is expressed in log-diﬀerence and therefore independent
from productivity levels. Third, omitted factors that may attract FDI do not bias the estimate
7An alternative possibility in the case of technology as a local public good is that the relevant productivity gap is
between the domestic ﬁrm and the most-productive FDI. Work by Girma and Görg (2004) consider this possibility.
In practice, however, the measure of the most productive FDI, based on one observation only, can be very noisy and
less reliable than average productivity of FDI’s.
6of β2 because we control for FDIdensityr,s,t.T h e e ﬀect of such variables is captured by the co-
eﬃcient β3. Lastly, this speciﬁcation enables us to separate a spillover eﬀect from a competition
eﬀect. According to Barrios et al. (2004) foreign owned ﬁrms drive up wages through their labor
demand and this forces domestic ﬁrms to reduce their employment which in turn increases their
productivity. Such eﬀect is probably due mostly to the presence of foreign ﬁrms (rather than to
their productivity) and therefore captured by β3. Moreover we can control for this eﬀect by adding
employment growth of domestic ﬁrms which would capture the cutting of ineﬃcient jobs. We do
this in section 5.4.
3 Measuring Total Factor Productivity
In order to estimate equation (1), the TFP of ﬁrms needs to be measured. As TFP cannot be
observed but it is always calculated as a "residual" from a production function estimation, diﬀerent
assumptions on production and diﬀerent estimation methods may produce diﬀerent estimates. Here
we take the approach of using several diﬀerent methods to measure Ai,r,s,t and we use each of these
measures to estimate equation (1). In particular, we use one measure of TFP based on a superlative
index and four measures based on production function estimation, two of which are more standard
(OLS and ﬁxed eﬀects) and two of which are concerned with non-standard issues (Levinsohn and
Petrin 2003 and eﬃcient frontier). The robustness of the results obtained using each set of measures
reinforces our conﬁdence in the estimated eﬀe c t .W ep r e s e n te a c ho ft h e s em e t h o d si nt h er e s to f
this section.
3.1 Total Factor Productivity via Superlative Index Number
We ﬁrst measure TFP using a superlative index number as derived in Caves, Christensen, and
Diewert (1982). This index assumes a translogarithmic production function, constant returns to
scale in production and uses data on factor cost shares. In particular, we deﬁne the TFP of a ﬁrm


















In the expression above yi,r,s,t is the natural logarithm of value added per worker (value of
7sales net of material cost) for ﬁrm i in region r,s e c t o rs and year t.
_
ys,t i st h ea v e r a g ev a l u eo f
yi,r,s,t for all ﬁrms in sector s and year t. αi,r,s is the elasticity of output to physical capital of
ﬁrm i. Assuming constant return to scale in production and proﬁt maximization behavior, αi,r,s is
measured by one minus the share of labor costs in value added for ﬁrm i. The parameter
_
αs is one
minus the average share of capital costs in sector s. ki,r,s,t is the natural logarithm of capital per
worker in ﬁrm i in region r,s e c t o rs and year t and
_
ks,t is the average of ki,r,s,t for all ﬁrms in sector
s and year t. Subtracting the averages is equivalent to controlling for sector-time speciﬁcf a c t o r s
that aﬀect TFP. Using this method TFP is calculated, not estimated and no standard erros are
produced. Hence, the only two types of errors involved are potential mistakes in the ﬁrm balance
sheet data and violations of the theoretical assumptions.
3.2 Total Factor Productivity via Production Function Estimation
As an alternative, it is possible to identify the relative TFP of ﬁrms through direct estimation of the
production function. We maintain the assumption of constant return to scale of output to capital
and labor8. However, rather than relying on cost shares we can directly estimate the elasticity of
value added to capital. We indicate with A
prod
i,r,s,t the measure of ﬁrm i0s TFP in region r sector s
and year t relative to the sector-year average . In this case, we estimate the following equation:






+ βsFi,r,s,t + A
prod
i,r,s,t + εi,r,s,t (3)
The coeﬃcient αs captures the elasticity of output to physical capital and it is allowed to vary by
sector, implying diﬀerent technologies across sectors. Fi,r,s,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the
ﬁrm is foreign-owned and zero otherwise. Some ﬁrms change ownership during the sample period
as they are acquired by multinational corporations, so that Fi,r,s,t for a given ﬁrm i may change
over time. The coeﬃcient βs captures the eﬀect on productivity of foreign ownership. Similarly to




i,r,s,t + εi,r,s,t) accounts for the remaining productivity of ﬁrm i.T h et e r mA
prod
i,r,s,t
is the part of the productivity that evolves over time as a state variable. This part is known to
8One of the robustness checks reported in Table 6 will remove this assumption.
8domestic owners and potential (foreign) buyers of the ﬁrm. The term εi,r,s,t is an i.i.d. zero mean
deviation of productivity, unknown to the owner of the ﬁrm and to potential buyers. Both terms,
however, are unobservable to the econometrician. If A
prod
i,r,s,t is a constant productivity advantage
(or disadvantage) of ﬁrm i i tc o u l db ec a p t u r e du s i n gaﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect φi in an otherwise standard
panel estimation of equation (3). However, if the variable A
prod
i,r,s,t varies over time, as ﬁrms can be
purchased with little obstacles by foreign multinationals, the optimal choice of acquisition is likely
to be a function of productivity A
prod
i,r,s,t. This would induce correlation between the term A
prod
i,r,s,t and
Fit, undermining the consistency of least squares estimates of αs and βs even if we include ﬁrm
ﬁxed eﬀects.
The problem of endogenous acquisition of ﬁrms is similar to the one of endogenous exit of
ﬁrms addressed by Olley and Pakes (1996) and Pavcnik (2001), or the one of endogenous choice
of inputs addressed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003). In our dataset we need to pay particular
attention to endogeneity of acquisitions, which happened frequently in the 90’s. On the other
hand, sluggishness of the European labor market guarantees that the innovations to the variable
kit are likely uncorrelated with the contemporary innovations to A
prod
i,r,s,t as it probably takes a ﬁrm
at least one year to adjust its capital and the labor inputs.
Our method, a variation on the procedure proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), relies on
the fact that the optimal choice of variable inputs of a ﬁrm, such as the material inputs used,
mit (for which data are available) depend monotonically on the ﬁrm’s productivity A
prod
i,r,s,t and on
its capital per worker kit. Therefore, using the fact that mit = m(A
prod
i,r,s,t,k i,r,s,t.) we can invert
the function and express A
prod
i,r,s,t as a function A(mit,k i,r,s,t). Using a polynomial approximation
of A(mit,k i,r,s,t) we can substitute this function into (3) absorbing all the variation of the term
A
prod
i,r,s,t in the error and, therefore, eliminating the correlation with Fit. This allows to obtain a
consistent estimate of the parameters βs in the ﬁrst stage of the estimation. Then in a second





aﬀect either the current capital/labor ratio, ki,r,s,t, or the past choice of ownership Fit−1 we can
use this moment restriction to implement a GMM consistent estimator of αs. The details of this
method are described in Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).
The crucial assumption of this approach is that it relies on the contemporary correlation between
use of materials and productivity shocks of a ﬁrm to "absorb" from the unobserved term the part
9correlated with the variable Fit, hence providing consistent estimates of βs.W e t h e n u s e t h e
assumption that capital and labor inputs take a period to adjust to productivity shocks (diﬀerently
from material input use that adjusts immediately) in order to get consistent estimates of the
parameter αs.
A similar method using investments, rather than material inputs, could be used to correct for
the sample selection of ﬁrms due to exit, as proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996). Unfortunately
we do not have investment data for the year previous to the one in which a ﬁrm exits the dataset.
Partially mitigating this problem, however, we run some probit regressions of the probability that
a ﬁrm exits the sample on capital per worker and other ﬁrm-characteristics. We do not ﬁnd any
signiﬁcant relationship with observable variables. Therefore, rather than drastically reducing the
sample size in order to include a balanced panel of ﬁrms, we simply use the whole sample assuming
that the inclusion (or exclusion) in our sample is not correlated with unobserved characteristics
that may aﬀect productivity.
A ﬁnal way of estimating total factor productivity relies on eﬃciency frontier estimation tech-
niques. These techniques estimate the distance of a ﬁrm’s technology from the production frontier.
Essentially, this amounts to the estimation of:






+ βsFit + uit + εit (4)
where uit follows a truncated normal distribution on the positive range measuring the technical
ineﬃciency and εit is the usual symmetrically distributed white noise error term.
The term uit is identiﬁed as a ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀe c tw i t ha ni n d u s t r y - s p e c i ﬁc estimated growth trend:
uit = ui · exp(κs · t),
where ui and κs and their standard errors are estimated by a maximum likelihood method. The
measure of TFP obtained with this method, A
front
i,r,st is deﬁned as A
front
i,r,s,t = uit+εit.9 The advantage
of this estimation method is that it explicitly assumes the existence of a technological frontier
speciﬁct oas e c t o ra n dy e a ra n di d e n t i ﬁes the productivity of ﬁrms as their ’relative’ distance from
9While uit alone is the estimated ineﬃciency term, the TFP of a plant should also include the zero-mean deviations
εit.I
10this frontier. This is appealing as the local presence of highly productive FDI’s can be considered as
a factor that helps a ﬁrm to catch-up to the technological frontier reducing its relative ineﬃciency.
4T h e D a t a
We have gathered and organized two novel datasets containing balance sheets, accounting and
ownership information for a large sample of manufacturing ﬁrms in Italy and Germany. The
database of Italian ﬁrms is an unbalanced panel of about two hundred thousand observations over
the time period 1992-1999. The number of ﬁrms increases over time and reaches about 40 thousand
units in 1999. This database includes, in principle, the whole universe of Italian manufacturing
ﬁrms. However, early in the sample, small ﬁrms are underrepresented, revealing that the coverage
of data collection has broadened over time. We exclude year 1992 and 1993 from the analysis as
missing data seem too large a fraction of the universe.
The database of German ﬁrms covers a 2% sample of German manufacturing ﬁrms and about
16% of German manufacturing employment. It is therefore, much smaller than the Italian database
and concentrates on large ﬁrms. The data consists of an unbalanced panel of about 800 manufac-
turing ﬁrms per year over the time period 1993-1999. We checked, however, that the dataset is
representative in the regional and time dimension (more in the Appendix).
Both datasets have ﬁrms as a unit of observation and balance sheets are the source of data.
This implies that the productive activity is assigned to the headquarters and not to the actual
location of plants. In our case, the problem is largely mitigated, because we use unconsolidated
balance sheet information both for Italy and Germany. This implies that only plants that are not
independent legal entities are mis-classiﬁed regionally. As these plants are usually small relative to
the headquarters and we are interested in total factor productivity (rather than volume of activity),
the resulting error will be small.
We maintain the econometric analysis for the Italian and German sample separate, because
of diﬀerences in industry codes, regional size and other deﬁnitions of variables between the two
datasets. Also, the German data capture a particularly interesting period, as the formerly isolated
East Germany was suddenly exposed to Western technology and FDI penetration. In contrast Italy
did not experience any major shock in the nineties but we can consider the decade as characterized
11by slow-growth and slow convergence in regional productivity. As the data are new we describe
each dataset and present summary statistics in the rest of this section10.
4.1 Italian Firms
Our database of Italian ﬁrms, obtained with the assistance of the Centro Studi Luca d’Agliano11,
merges the AIDA database of Bureau van Dijk (which contains balance sheet information) and the
multinational ﬁrm database Reprint of Politecnico di Milano (which contains ownership informa-
tion). The observations on ﬁrms’ balance sheets include data on the number of employees, on wage
cost, on the values of sales, on the value of materials used as intermediates, on ﬁxed assets of the
company, on the industrial sector, its location and its name. The industry code contains 23 man-
ufacturing sectors. Our deﬁnition of region, for Italy, is the so-called "Provincia", a rather small
administrative unit containing one main city. There are 103 of them in Italy and they correspond
to the "NUTS3" aggregation level in the Eurostat territorial classiﬁcation.
The summary statistics of the main variables for three representative years within our sample
(1994, 1996 and 1998) are reported in Table1a. We deﬁne the universe of foreign-owned ﬁrms as
those ﬁrms with a strictly positive fraction of voting rights held by foreigners. Typically the share
of voting rights held by foreigners will be large enough to exercise control of the ﬁrm. In 1998
total employment in foreign ﬁrms was 402,704 employees. The large increase in the number of ﬁrms
covered by the database from 1994 to 1998 and the decrease in their average size (for domestic
ﬁrms) is due to the fact that an increasing number of smaller ﬁr m si si n c l u d e do v e rt i m e . W e
eliminated from the data those observations that contain outliers in the levels and growth rates of
the ﬁrm variables. The appendix describes the selection procedure carefully.
Foreign-owned ﬁrms tend to have higher value added per worker, to be more capital intensive
and pay larger wages than domestic ﬁrms. On average, therefore, foreign-owned ﬁrms have higher
labor productivity than domestic ones and may be the source of the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect for
Italian ﬁrms. We should keep in mind, however, that the summary statistics presented in Table 1a
conceal large diﬀerences across sectors and localities. Foreign-owned ﬁrms are concentrated mostly
in large urban areas in the north-west of the country (mostly Milano, Torino and Genova) and
10Further details on the construction of the variables are contained in the Appendix.
11W ea r eg r a t e f u lt oG i o r g i oB a r b aN a v a r e t t if o rm a k i n gt h i sd a t aa v a i l a b l et ou s .
12around Rome. They are present, however in smaller concentration in most of the provinces. This
uneven distribution of FDI is illustrated in Figure 1. The Figure captures with diﬀerent shades of
grey the diﬀerent percentages of employed workers in foreign-owned ﬁrms across provinces. Darker
colors correspond to higher FDI concentration. The map also shows the boundaries of provinces.
4.2 German Firms
Our database of German ﬁrms, obtained by retrieving past and current data releases by Bureau van
Dijk, is a subset taken from the database Amadeus 200,000 containing only large manufacturing
ﬁrms with more than 200 employees or more than 10 Million Deutsche Marks Assets or more than
10 Million Deutsche Marks Sales. The dataset of German ﬁr m sc o n t a i n st h es a m ev a r i a b l e sa s
the Italian one, i.e. employment, wage costs, sales, ﬁxed assets, material costs and information
on the location, sector and ownership of the ﬁrm. For Germany, given the smaller number of
ﬁrms included in the sample (about 800), we are forced to use a fairly broad regional aggregation,
i.e. the 16 Bundesländer12 to have a suﬃcient number of domestic and foreign-owned ﬁrms in
each region. Given the large size of ﬁrms included in the German dataset we believe that it is
appropriate to consider larger regions as potential receivers of spillovers, because large ﬁrms are
likely to hire workers and have interactions in a larger "basin of attraction" than smaller ﬁrms.
Twenty manufacturing sectors (deﬁned according to the U.S. SIC code) are included. Three sectors
are excluded because of small-sample concerns. We investigate in the Appendix how representative
these data are using aggregate data of Statistisches Bundesamt (2000) and Deutsche Bundesbank
(2001) as comparison. Consistently with the deﬁnition used for Italy, we deﬁne as foreign-owned all
ﬁrms which reported some foreign ownership of their voting shares13.W ed e ﬁne also Western-owned
ﬁrms in East Germany as multinational ﬁrms14. Companies of Treuhandanstalt, the privatization
agency of the German government, are considered local ﬁrms.
Table 1b shows the summary statistics for the German dataset. Notice the larger size of domestic
and foreign-owned ﬁrms and their higher productivity and capital intensity relative to Italian ﬁrms.
Even in this case labor productivity and wages are signiﬁcantly higher in foreign-owned ﬁrms than in
12The Bundesländer correspond to the NUTS1 classiﬁcation of EUROSTAT.
13Relevant for ownership is the reported ultimate owner. Only if no information is available on the ultimate owner,
the direct ownership determines the nationality of a ﬁrm.
14Criscuolo and Martin (2002) show that UK-owned multinationals in the UK have the same productivity advantage
over UK ﬁrms with no plants abroad as foreign-owned multinationals.
13domestic ones conﬁrming the idea that the last group enjoys technological advantage over domestic
ﬁrms.
We construct the variable FDIdensityr,t as the share of total workers employed by foreign-
owned ﬁrms in Lander r . Data on FDI employment were obtained from Deutsche Bundesbank
(2001) 15 and total employment is obtained from Statistisches Bundesamt (2000)16.
Similarly to Italy, the majority of foreign-owned ﬁrms is located in large metropolitan areas.
Figure 2 illustrates the density of foreign-owned ﬁrms across Bundesländer using darker colors for
higher densities. The density of FDI is highest in the Bundesländer containing Berlin, the political
center, Frankfurt, the ﬁnancial center, and Hamburg, the major German port. While hosting most
of the foreign ﬁrms these regions are not necessarily those receiving the largest beneﬁts from them
because the technological lead of FDI over domestic ﬁr m sc a nb es m a l l e rt h a ni nl e s sd e v e l o p e d
regions.
5 Estimation Results
5.1 Replicating Standard Spillover Regressions
In this section, we replicate a basic regression used by Aitken and Harrison (1999), among others,
in order to investigate into spillovers from FDI. Table 2 reports the results from a regression of
ﬁrm-level output on ﬁrm-level inputs (Labor, Capital and Materials) and on FDIdensityr,s,t.T h e
regression includes only domestic ﬁrms and assumes a log linear production function. We report
the estimates of the elasticity of output to the three inputs as well as the eﬀect of FDI density in
three speciﬁcations for each country. The ﬁrst three speciﬁcations (I-III) are estimated on Italian
data while speciﬁcations IV to VI are estimated on German data.
Column I and IV include the mentioned explanatory variables plus sector and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
Such regressions yields a signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the FDIdensity variable.17 This result is quali-
tatively and quantitatively similar to those obtained in studies of other countries. FDIdensityhas
15We thank Heinz Herrmann of Deutsche Bundesbank for providing these unpublished data.
16There are some incompatibilities between Amadeus, the data of Deutsche Bundesbank (2001) and the data of
Statistisches Bundesamt (2000) such as the deﬁnition of sectors, the deﬁnition of FDI and the reporting obligations
by ﬁrm size.
17We use heteroscedasticity robust standard errors rather than clustered standard errors despite the Moulton
problem caused by the FDI density variable to keep results comparable with the previous literature.
14a positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient on the domestic ﬁrm’s TFP.
Column II and V replace the sector ﬁxed eﬀects with ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects and this renders the
coeﬃcient of FDIdensity insigniﬁcant. This is exactly what Aitken and Harrison (1999) found in
a similar speciﬁcation using their data on Venezuelan ﬁrms (see their Table 2, speciﬁcation 3 and
4). Next, Aitken and Harrison (1999) show that regional control variables such as average regional
wage-costs (that proxies for human capital, unobserved diﬀerences of labor quality or other location
factors) also render the density variable insigniﬁcant. We replicate their result in columns III and
VI by including average regional wages. We also run a regression that includes regional ﬁxed eﬀects
(not reported in the table). Also in this case the FDI density variable has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
productivity of domestic ﬁrms. Finally, we allow elasticities to vary by sector and we include all
ﬁrms in our regression (domestic and foreign-owned) controlling for ownership. The estimates of
the eﬀect of FDI on productivity in those speciﬁcations (not reported in the table and available
upon request) are very similar to those presented in Table 2 and not signiﬁcant.
Summing up, the FDI density variable is positively correlated with domestic ﬁrms’ productivity
growth at the regional level, but after controlling for regional characteristics such correlation
disappears. Regional factors that are responsible for growth may also be responsible for the presence
of FDI inducing a spurious correlation. This does not mean, however, that no spillovers from FDI
exist. Instead, the FDI density variable may not be a good proxy for the intensity of technological
spillovers in the ﬁrst place. We explore in the remaining of this section the role of productivity
advantage of FDI in spurring productivity growth of domestic ﬁrms.
5.2 Comparing Total Factor Productivity Measures
We estimate total factor productivity of a ﬁrm, Ai,r,s,t,u s i n gt h eﬁve methods presented in section
3. The ﬁrst method, called "Superlative Index", implements equation (2). We use data on the
share of wage costs relative to value added, in each ﬁrm and on average, to calculate the elasticity
of value added to labor (and to capital). This method has the advantage of by-passing any issue of
endogeneity of inputs and ownership as it is not estimation-based. The following four methods are
estimation-based, instead. In particular, we implement regression (3) using simple OLS estimation
(once data are cleaned of their time-sector component), or controlling for ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀects or
accounting for endogeneity of ownership using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method. Finally,
15the last columns of Table 3a and 3b report the estimates obtained using the eﬃciency frontier
estimation and allowing for "ﬁrm-speciﬁc" ineﬃciencies.
We report the estimated elasticities of value added to capital, by industry (parameters αs
of expression 2 and 3) for Italy (Table 3a) and Germany (Table 3b) using each method. The
index-based measures of αs,r e p o r t e di nt h eﬁrst column of Table 3a and 3b, vary by sector and
cluster around 0.4-0.5. They seem somewhat large, relative to the previously estimated elasticities
(Pavcnick 2002, Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003) which, for several manufacturing sectors are in the
range 0.10 -0.20. The estimation-based elasticities, reported in column 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Table 3a
and 3b are much closer to this range.
In spite of some variation depending on the method used, the coeﬃcients obtained using diﬀerent
estimation methods seem rather robust and precisely estimated. As an example, elasticity of output
to capital in the Food Sector for Italy range between 0.22 and 0.26. The base estimate for the same
sector in the U.S. reported by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) is 0.24. For textiles our estimates range
between 0.12 and 0.15 and theirs is 0.18 and for wood products our estimates range between 0.15
and 0.19 and theirs is 0.19.
The standard errors on these estimates range between 0.01 and 0.03. They are asymptotically
heteroscedasticity consistent for the OLS and the Fixed-eﬀect method, while in the Levinsohn
and Petrin (2003) and eﬃcient frontier estimation we report the bootstrapped standard errors.
O na v e r a g ep a r a m e t e r sa r em o r ep r e c i s e l ye s t i m a t e di nt h eI t a l i a nc a s ea sw eh a v em a n ym o r e
observations. In particular, the standard errors of the estimates using the Levinsohn and Petrin
(2003) method could be very large in the German sample. However, except for few cases, the
parameters for German sectors are also reasonable and close to the range estimated for Italian
ﬁrms.
In spite of the variation in the estimates of factor elasticity, the ﬁve methods produce TFP
estimates that are remarkably similar to each other. Table 4 reports the correlation across ﬁrms
a n dt i m eo ft h e s eﬁve measures for Italian and German data. The TFP values obtained using the
three estimation methods (OLS, FE, Levinsohn and Petrin and eﬃcient frontier) have extremely
high correlation with each other, in the range 0.98-0.99. However the index-based values are also
highly correlated to the other measures exhibiting a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.7-0.8. This reassures
us in the interpretation of each of these measures as a proxy of actual productivity of a ﬁrm.
165.3 Evidence on the Veblen-Gerschenkron Eﬀect
In this section we estimate speciﬁcation (1) to capture spillover eﬀects. We use the Blundell and
Bond (1998) one-step system GMM estimator which improves eﬃciency upon the Arellano and
Bond (1991) GMM diﬀerence estimator (especially in panels with short time dimension) by using
past levels as well as time diﬀerences to instrument the lagged level of ﬁrm TFP. This method
provides consistent estimates (as opposed to OLS or ﬁxed eﬀects that produce biased estimates
in panels due to the correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the error term). The
GMM estimates on Italian data are based on a restricted set of instruments, while the German
estimates employ all dependent variables, lags and lagged diﬀerences of the dependent variable as
instruments. The dynamic panel estimations include ﬁrm random eﬀects.
The results of the dynamic panel estimation are reported in Table 5a for Italy and in Table 5b
for Germany. Each column of each table uses a measure of productivity obtained from one of the
ﬁve diﬀerent methods described above. The reported standard errors are heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent. Still, the GMM-estimator assumes no autocorrelation of second order
or higher. A second order AR-test (AR2) investigates this assumption. Finally, the validity (exo-
geneity) of instruments is tested using a heteroscedasticity consistent Hansen-J test. In principle,
the Blundell-Bond estimator is still consistent, when the data are non-stationary, but Binder et al.
(2003) show that the small sample properties become unfavorable. Therefore, we apply a simple
test suggested by Bond et al. (2002) to test for unit roots in our data. We are able to reject the
null hypothesis of non-stationarity for each of the variables included in our regressions (the tests
statistics are reported in the Appendix). Moreover, all the auxiliary AR2-tests cannot reject the
assumption of no autocorrelation of order two at the 5% level and no Hansen-J test rejects the
assumption of exogeneity of instruments at the 5% conﬁdence level in both tables. Therefore, exo-
geneity of lagged diﬀerences and of instruments cannot be rejected.18 The coeﬃcients of interest are




r,s,t−1 −Ai,r,s,t−1) and on the density of multinationals
in the regional industry, (FDI densityrst).
The ﬁrst result emerging consistently from our estimates is that the "Productivity-Gap" variable
h a sa l w a y sap o s i t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on productivity growth of domestic ﬁrms. This is true
18One caveat remains: The Hansen-J test is extremely sensitive to small changes in speciﬁcations and to inclu-
sion/exclusion of variables.
17both for Italian and German ﬁrms and for each measure of productivity. Since the coeﬃcient β2
of equation (1) is positive and signiﬁcant, the productivity gap between local multinationals and
the domestic ﬁrms acts as a growth-promoting factor, revealing a positive Veblen-Gerschenkron
eﬀect. Such positive eﬀect does not stem from general convergence of ﬁrms’ productivity, because
we control for lagged productivity. The positive eﬀect of local catch-up due to the presence of
highly productive foreign ﬁrms is estimated above and beyond that mechanism. Moreover, by
construction, the variable Ai,r,s,t is cleaned of any time-sector ﬁxed eﬀects so that the correlation
between productivity gap and domestic ﬁrm growth cannot be due to a sector-speciﬁcb u s i n e s s
cycle eﬀect, or FDI concentrations in some speciﬁcs e c t o r s .
Quantitatively, the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect is of comparable size for German and Italian
ﬁrms. A 10% productivity gap between a domestic ﬁrm and the local multinational ﬁrms translates
into 4-6% larger productivity after one year for the average domestic ﬁrm. This is a very large eﬀect.
Given the similarity of the estimates between the Italian and the German case, we tend to believe
that the coeﬃcients capture a similar mechanisms at work in the two countries. In spite of the
similarity of the coeﬃcient estimates, German ﬁrms probably received larger beneﬁts from FDI
(through this channel) because of the larger initial productivity gap of the eastern domestic ﬁrms
and therefore faster catch-up.
The second result emerging from our estimates is that the density of foreign-owned ﬁrms in the
sector-region has generally not a signiﬁcant eﬀe c to np r o d u c t i v i t yg r o w t ho fd o m e s t i cﬁrms in most
of the speciﬁcations of Tables 5a and 5b. When the eﬀect is signiﬁcant, however, it is positive.
As argued above this may reﬂect the fact that the FDI density is largest in urban areas which are
centers of economic activity, where the productivity of domestic ﬁr m si sa l r e a d yh i g ha n dh e n c e
less aﬀected by technological spillovers. Instead, in less developed regions the larger productivity
g a pw i t hf o r e i g n - o w n e dﬁrms is the main cause of technological catch-up even if the density of FDI
is not too large.
Finally, we tested that (β1− β2)<1 which ensures conditional convergence of ﬁrm’s productivity
to a common sector-year growth path. This restriction is never rejected at any standard conﬁdence
level. Our estimates, therefore, can be interpreted as follows: while some technological factors
speciﬁc to sectors determine a common rate of productivity growth, ﬁrms that are located in the
same region as highly productive FDI, tend to converge to higher relative productivity levels as they
18beneﬁt from technological transfer. To the contrary the concentration of foreign ﬁrms in the sector-
region seems to have only a smaller and insigniﬁcant eﬀect on relative productivity of domestic
ﬁrms. This is consistent with local technological spillovers that depend on the "technological gap"
b e t w e e nF D Ia n dd o m e s t i cﬁrms, rather than on the density of the last ones. As found above, FDI
can be concentrated in advanced regions, where there is not much scope for technological learning,
while fewer highly productive foreign companies have a strong impact on less developed regions.
5.4 Robustness of the Veblen-Gerschenkron Eﬀect
We performed several robustness checks of our results. Our main goal is to conﬁrm that the
Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect on local ﬁrms’ productivity growth remains positive and signiﬁcant
to changes in the speciﬁcations and to the inclusion of control variables. We summarize these
robustness checks in Table 6 by reporting only the estimates and the standard errors for the
coeﬃcient of the "Productivity Gap" that has been the focus of our analysis. We report only the
speciﬁcations using the TFP measures based on the superlative index (Sup. Ind.) and on the
ﬁrm ﬁxed eﬀect production function estimation (FE), because all the "estimation-based" methods
(OLS, FE, Levinson and Petrin and Frontier) produced very similar results. Columns one and two
of Table 6 report the coeﬃcients estimates using Italian data, columns three and four report the
estimates using German data.
Speciﬁcation (1) reports the basic estimates, taken from column one and two of Tables 5a (for
Italy) and 5b (for Germany). Speciﬁcation (2) omits the variable that captures the density of
employment in foreign-owned ﬁrms in the regional sector. It is clear from the reported results
that including that variable or excluding it does not make any diﬀerence. This is true also when
we use other estimation methods (such as Arellano and Bond, in speciﬁcation (3) and (4)). The
productivity-gap variable seems the only important determinant of spillovers from FDI’s. Speciﬁca-
tion (3) checks the robustness of the results to the estimation method. Often these dynamic panel
methods, based on GMM estimation, are very sensitive to the choice of instruments. The Arellano
and Bond estimator uses past values of the productivity level as instruments for the current changes
of productivity. The point estimates of the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect increase somewhat using
this method, however, the diﬀerence is less than two standard deviations from the eﬀects estimated
using the Blundell and Bond method except for column one where the diﬀerence is somewhat larger.
19More interestingly, in speciﬁcation (5) we include in the regression the change in ﬁrm’s employ-
ment as a control variable to check whether the positive catch-up eﬀect of local ﬁrms to multina-
tional productivity was simply achieved by trimming ineﬃciently employed workers (i.e. through
a decrease in employment). While productivity growth has a signiﬁcant negative association with
employment growth, revealing in equilibrium the potential eﬀects of workers’ selections on produc-
tivity growth, the Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀect is still positive and signiﬁcant, and not much reduced.
For German ﬁrms the coeﬃcient estimates are between 0.3 and 0.55 (std. errors 0.06-0.09) while
for Italian ﬁrms they are in the range 0.4-0.6 (std. errors 0.02). In this case, the Hansen J-test
of exogeneity of instruments could not always reject endogeneity of the predetermined variables at
the standard levels of signiﬁcance. While auxiliary tests may occasionally fail, this hardly aﬀects
the magnitude or signiﬁcance level of the estimated coeﬃcients19. As the point estimates are very
stable and those tests very sensitive, we regard the overall evidence as favorable to the existence of
strong Veblen-Gerschenkron eﬀects.
Finally, in speciﬁcation (6) we performed a more demanding robustness check by re-estimating
the TFP measures (in the OLS, FE and Levinsohn and Petrin Method) without imposing constant
returns to scale in the ﬁrm’s production function. For the superlative Index method we need
to assume constant returns to scale (CRS) in order to identify the TFP so we cannot perform
this check. The estimates of the elasticity of output to capital (not reported) obtained without
imposing CRS are often quite diﬀerent from before. Remarkably, however, the TFP measures are
highly correlated to those previously estimated and the estimates of the magnitude of the Veblen-
Gerschenkron eﬀect are closely aligned with what we found earlier. Namely, for Italy we obtain
coeﬃcients in the range 0.4-0.6 (table 6 reports only the coeﬃcient based on FE-TFP which is equal
to 0.49) and for Germany in the range 0.3-0.6 (again in Table 6 only the one based on FE-TFP is
reported and it is equal to 0.57) .
6C o n c l u s i o n
Technological catch-up is a powerful force behind the development of countries and regions and it
is likely to be an important cause of convergence in income per capita across OECD countries. FDI
19Using German data no auxiliary test ever failed. Only using Italian data we encountered occasional problems of
rejection.
20are channels of diﬀusion of technological knowledge. It seems natural, therefore, to inquire whether
the impact of FDI on productivity of local ﬁrms works through a catching-up mechanisms that
depends on geographical proximity and on the technological gap. Interestingly, this has not been
done yet. Our article uses two novel datasets of Italian and German ﬁrms to test this hypothesis.
Rather than the trite speciﬁcation in which the presence of FDI’s has an eﬀect on local productivity,
we test the more articulate hypothesis that technological advantage of foreign ﬁrms, coupled with
proximity in location and similarity in specialization, helps local ﬁrms to grow faster. Technological
advantage of foreign-owned ﬁrms is better captured by the average productivity advantage of FDI
in a sector-region rather than by their concentration. Our empirical test conﬁr m st h i st h e o r y .A s
our story is based on productivity catch-up and TFP growth we implement in the paper several
diﬀerent methods to measure ﬁrms TFP, each with some advantages and limits. This is also
a relatively original contribution and, in our case, it establishes that index-based measures of
ﬁrm-level productivity are highly correlated with estimation based measures. In particular, the
simple cost-based superlative index or a simple Fixed Eﬀect estimation of the production function
produce, for our purposes, similar results than the more sophisticated methods that account for
ﬁrm heterogeneity or for endogeneity of foreign ownership.
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Table 1a: Summary Statistics for Italian Manufacturing Firms
Ownership: Foreign Domestic
Year: 1994 1996 1998 1 9 9 41 9 9 61 9 9 8
Value Added per Employee 123.69 128.67 128.61 106.08 110.41 101.88
Fixed Assets per Employee 99.91 85.18 96.85 77.34 74.39 73.91
Material Inputs per Employee 314.46 323.77 334.24 305.37 295.65 280.84
Average Wage Cost/ Employee 71.48 69.77 70.82 56.66 57.85 56.43
Number of Employees per ﬁrm 256 332 356 72 62 54
Number of ﬁrms 354 898 832 9858 30469 36738
Source: AIDA dataset, merged with Politecnico di Milano data. Values are in Millions of 1999 Italian Lire. The
dataset has been purged from outliers and from ﬁrms exhibiting unusual changes in capital and employment from
one year to the other.
Table 1b: Summary Statistics for German Manufacturing Firms
Ownership: Foreign Domestic
Year: 1994 1996 1998 1994 1996 1998
Value Added per Employee 279.52 248.86 296.43 196.65 214.95 239.21
Fixed Assets per Employee 133.36 149.66 160.18 151.37 181.50 204.76
Material Inputs per Employee 397.39 392.51 458.43 240.98 275.20 330.39
Average Wage Cost/ Employee 91.46 97.50 103.70 82.15 89.23 95.93
Number of Employees per ﬁrm 1646 1414 1311 1769 1406 1331
Number of ﬁrms 203 226 212 653 574 556
Source: Amadeus Dataset. Values are in thousands of 1999 Deutsche Marks. The dataset has been purged from
outliers and from ﬁrms exhibiting unusual changes in capital and employment from one year to the other.
22Table 2: Standard Spillover Regressions for Italy and Germany
Country Italy Germany
Speciﬁcation OLS Firm Regional OLS Firm Regional
FE Control FE Control































































Sector Fixed Eﬀects Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Time Fixed Eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eﬀects No No No No No No
Firm Fixed Eﬀects No Yes No No Yes No
No.Obs. 162023 162023 161692 3702 3702 3623
R
2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.97
Dependent Variable: ln(Yit), natural logarithm of sales of domestic ﬁrms.
**=signiﬁcant at the 5% level, *= signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses
23Table 3a: Production Function Parameters Estimates for Italy by Sector
Estimation Superlative OLS Firm Levinsohn- Eﬀ.
Method: Index Fixed Eﬀect -Petrin Frontier
coef.s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e.
Sector (ATECO deﬁnitions)
Food and Kindred Products 0.47. 0 0.22 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.26 0.04 0.22 0.01
Tobacco n.a . n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Textile 0.42. 0 0.12 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.13 0.00
Apparel 0.40. 0 0.17 0.01 0.21 0.02 0.21 0.01 0.18 0.01
Leather and Shoes 0.38. 0 0.17 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.16 0.02 0.18 0.01
L u m b e ra n dW o o dP r o d u c t s 0.41. 0 0.19 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.16 0.01
Paper Products 0.44. 0 0.19 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.22 0.02 0.17 0.01
Printing-Publishing 0.38. 0 0.08 0.01 0.17 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.01
Oil Reﬁneries 0.53. 0 0.21 0.01 0.16 0.03 0.25 0.06 0.18 0.02
Chemical 0.47. 0 0.10 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.23 0.03 0.13 0.01
Plastics 0.43. 0 0.17 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.18 0.01 0.18 0.01
Stone, Clay, Glass, Cement 0.40. 0 0.16 0.01 0.20 0.01 0.19 0.01 0.17 0.01
Primary Metals 0.43. 0 0.17 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.01
Fabricated Metals 0.38. 0 0.14 0.01 0.18 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.16 0.00
Mechanical Machinery 0.37. 0 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.13 0.00
Computers 0.37. 0 0.06 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.02
Electric Machinery 0.38. 0 0.13 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.09 0.04 0.14 0.01
Communication Equipment 0.39. 0 0.09 0.01 0.19 0.02 0.17 0.03 0.13 0.01
Precision Equipment 0.38. 0 0.11 0.01 0.17 0.01 0.19 0.04 0.13 0.01
Auto 0.38. 0 0.20 0.01 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.01
Other Transportation 0.38. 0 0.14 0.01 0.16 0.02 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.01
Furnitures 0.38. 0 0.12 0.01 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.15 0.00
Repair and Recycling 0.46. 0 0.27 0.02 0.20 0.04 0.23 0.05 0.18 0.02
The estimated coeﬃcient in each column is the elasticity of value added to the stock of physical capital, assuming
constant returns to scale in the production function.
First Column: Superlative index numbers, see main text for calculations. Standard error is zero, because the
value is calculated, not estimated.
Second and Third Column: OLS and ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects estimates of the log-linear production function. Standard
errors are hetheroskedasticity consistent.
Fourth Column: Levinsohn-Petrin Estimates, described in detail in the main text. Standard errors are boot-
strapped.
Fifth Column: Eﬃcient Frontier estimates. Std errors are bootstrapped.
24Table 3b: Production Function Parameter Estimates for Germany by Sector
Estimation Superlative OLS Firm Levinsohn- Eﬀ.
Method: Index Fixed Eﬀect -Petrin Frontier
Parameter coef.s.e. coef s.e. coef s.e. coef.s.e. coef s.e.
Sector (SIC deﬁnitions)
Food and Kindred Products 0.68. 0 0.28 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.21 0.02
Tobacco n.a.. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Textile 0.45. 0 0.12 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.03
Apparel 0.62. 0 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.14 0.30 0.17 0.06 0.05
L u m b e ra n dW o o dP r o d u c t s 0.45. 0 0.20 0.04 0.16 0.05 0.38 0.13 0.18 0.03
Furnitures and Fixtures 0.46. 0 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.10 0.08
Paper products 0.54. 0 0.23 0.03 0.20 0.10 0.02 0.09 0.22 0.04
Priniting and Publishing 0.56. 0 0.26 0.09 0.06 0.12 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.04
Chemicals 0.58. 0 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.10
Petroleum Reﬁning 0.73. 0 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.11 0.01
Rubber and Plastics 0.46. 0 0.24 0.04 0.52 0.11 0.19 0.20 0.23 0.08
Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete 0.5 . 0 0.31 0.02 0.31 0.04 0.23 0.01 0.16 0.04
Primary Metals 0.43. 0 0.20 0.04 0.13 0.05 0.27 0.09 0.29 0.03
Fabricated Metals 0.39. 0 0.32 0.01 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.15 0.02
Industrial Machinery and Computer 0.42. 0 0.20 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.11 0.04
Electric Machinery 0.43. 0 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.19 0.02
Transportation equipment 0.40. 0 0.28 0.03 0.28 0.14 0.08 0.15 0.12 0.05
Precision Instruments 0.41. 0 0.19 0.01 0.18 0.03 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.04
Miscellaneous Manufacturing n.a.. n.a n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Leather products n.a.. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
The estimated coeﬃcient in each column is the elasticity of value added to the stock of physical capital, assuming
constant returns to scale in the production function.
First Column: Superlative index numbers, see main text for calculations. Standard error is zero, because the
value is calculated, not estimated.
Second and Third Column: OLS and ﬁxed ﬁrm eﬀects estimates of the log-linear production function. Standard
errors are hetheroskedasticity consistent.
Fourth Column: Levinsohn-Petrin Estimates, described in detail in the main text. Standard errors are boot-
strapped.
Fifth Column: Eﬃcient Frontier estimates. Std. errors are bootstrapped.
25Table 4: Correlation between diﬀerent TFP Measures
ITALIAN FIRMS
Sup. Index Lev.Pet. FE OLS Eﬀ.Front.
Sup.Index 1
Lev.Pet. 0.841 1
FE 0.859 0.998 1
OLS 0.799 0.994 0.991 1
Eﬀ.Front. 0.821 0.997 0.996 0.999 1
GERMAN FIRMS
Sup. Index Lev.Pet. FE OLS Eﬀ.Front.
Sup.Index 1
Lev.Pet. 0.708 1
FE 0.713 0.976 1
OLS 0.723 0.981 0.974 1
Eﬀ.Front. 0.716 0.984 0.987 0.993 1
The measures of ﬁrm-level TFP are calculated in diﬀerences from the sector-period. Each method is described
in detail in the text.
26Table 5a
Dynamic Panel Estimation, Italy
Productivity Superlative Firm OLS Levinsohn Eﬀ.



































Sector/year-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 32462 36057 36057 36057 36057
AR(1) − Test -27.47** -29.02** -27.98** -28.51** -28.36**
AR(2) − Test 1.17 0.76 0.33 0.51 0.48












Dependent variable is Ai,s,r,t+1, the TFP of ﬁrm i in region r and sector s for year t+1, calculated according
to several diﬀerent methods.
Ai,s,r,t :TFP of ﬁrm i in region r and sector s for year t, calculated according to several diﬀerent methods.
Productivity Gap: diﬀerence in productivity between the average productivity of a foreign-owned ﬁrm in region
r and sector s in year t and domestic ﬁrm i at time t. Strict exogeneity assumed.
(FDI density)r,s,t : Share of workers employed by foreign-owned ﬁrms in region r and sector s in year t.
Strict exogeneity assumed.
AR(2) − Test: Test statistic for the restriction that two-period lagged productivity levels are exogenous
instruments for current changes in productivity
Hansen− J − Test: Test of exogeneity of the predetermined and instrumental variables.
**= Signiﬁcant at the 1% level; * signiﬁcant at the 5% level
Errors in parenthesis are clustered by ﬁrms.
27Table 5b
Dynamic Panel Estimation, Germany
Productivity Superlative Firm OLS Levinsohn Eﬀ.



































Sector/year-Eﬀects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1236 1285 1291 1225 1291
AR(1) − Test -4.80** -3.15** -2.99** -4.01** -3.01**
AR(2) − Test 0.69 0.10 -0.11 0.95 -0.11












Dependent variable is Ai,s,r,t+1, the TFP of ﬁrm i in region r and sector s for year t+1, calculated according
to several diﬀerent methods.
Ai,s,r,t :TFP of ﬁrm i in region r and sector s for year t, calculated according to several diﬀerent methods.
Productivity Gap: diﬀerence in productivity between the average productivity of a foreign-owned ﬁrm in region
r and sector s in year t and domestic ﬁrm i at time t. Strict exogeneity assumed.
(FDI density)r,s,t : Share of workers employed by foreign-owned ﬁrms in region r and sector s in year t.
Strict exogeneity assumed.
AR(2) − Test: Test statistic for the restriction that two-period lagged productivity levels are exogenous
instruments for current changes in productivity
Hansen− J − Test: Test of exogeneity of the predetermined and instrumental variables.
**= Signiﬁcant at the 1% level; * signiﬁcant at the 5% level
Errors in parenthesis are clustered by ﬁrms.
28Table 6
Estimates of the Veblen-Gerschenkron Eﬀect, Robustness Checks.
Country Italy Germany

























































Std. error in parentheses. *=signiﬁcant at the 5% level, **= =signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
The table reports only the estimated coeﬃcient on the variable "Productivity Gap". Each cell corresponds to
the result of a diﬀerent regression.
Speciﬁcation (1): Basic speciﬁcation using the Blundell-Bond eﬃcient estimator. The estimates are those reported
in the ﬁrst and second column of Table 5a (for Italy) and 5b (for Germany).
Speciﬁcation (2): Basic speciﬁcation without including the variable FDIdensity
Speciﬁcation (3): Estimates performed using the original Arellano and Bond estimator
Speciﬁcation (4): Estimates performed using the original Arellano and Bond estimator, not including the variable
FDIdensity
Speciﬁcation (5): Basic speciﬁcation using the Blundell-Bond eﬃcient estimator and including employment
growth as explanatory variable at the ﬁrm level. Employment variable assumed pre-determined (not strictly ex-
ogenous).
Speciﬁcation (6): The TFP estimates in the ﬁrst stage of the econometric procedure have been obtained without
imposing constant returns to scale (in capital and labor) of the production function.
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No t e: The m ap show s t he concentr ati on of FDI  calculated as share of 
wo r kers em ployed i n f oreign-ow ned f i r ms   i n a Pr ovi nce i n year  1998.     The 
shades of gray (darker shades denotes higher concentr ati on) are fi ve and 
i nt erval s are spaced so that  regions are equall y di str i but ed am ong t hem  
( r oughl y  t we n t y  provi nces  per  i nt erval ) .  







Fi gure 2 
C oncentrati on  of  FDI   relati ve  t o  Do me s t i c Fi rm s,  G erm any 1998 
 
 
No t e: The m ap show s t he concent r ati on of FDI  calculated as share of
wo r kers em ployed i n f oreign-ow ned f i r ms   i n a Bundesl änder  i n year  1998.  
The  shades of  gray ( darker  color  denot es hi gher  concentr ati on)  are t hree and 
i nt erval s are spaced so that  Landers are equall y di str i but ed am ong them
( r oughl y  f i ve  Landers per  i nt erval ) .  
Da t a Sour ce:  U npubl i shed Da t a of  De u t sche Bundesbank.  
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31A Appendix: Data Description
A.1 Italian ﬁrms
Firm data are from the database AIDA of Bureau van Dijk and are matched with ownership infor-
mation from the FDI database of Politecnico Milano. Only manufacturing ﬁrms are included with
information on a two-digit industry code (ATECO), the province name of the ﬁrm headquarter,
and a dummy for foreign ownership participation. Ownership information is collected biannually
and assumed to be persistent in a year previous to a reporting year. Whenever available, un-
consolidated balance sheet data are used to avoid as much as possible multi-plant ﬁrms, which
may have production in regions other than the one where the headquarter is located. In general,
Bureau van Dijk does not apply any exclusion criteria. However, very small enterprises appear
under-represented. Moreover, the database is growing over time. While in the initial years only
large ﬁrms are sampled, there is no systematic pattern recognizable according to which sampling
strategy the database is enlarged until it reaches full size.
To control for outliers and to keep the database homogenous, we exclude a number of observa-
tions according to the following criteria:
1) Observations for which capital stocks or sales data were reported as 0 were excluded; obser-
vations for which material costs were larger than sales were excluded; observations for which gross
operating proﬁts (sales minus material cost minus wage costs) are larger than 80% of sales value or
smaller than -80% were excluded. Firms with less than 500 000 Lira per employee ﬁxed assets and
more than 3 Billion Lira per employee were excluded. These exclusion criteria eliminate outliers.
2) All observations with value added divided by sales smaller than 10% were excluded. These
ﬁrms are considered sales ﬁrms that are missclassiﬁed by Bureau van Dijk as production units.
3) All observations with growth rates of employment, ﬁxed assets per employee, material, and
average wage cost per employee20 of more than 400% or less than minus 80 % per year were excluded;
These criteria ensure that the structure of a ﬁrm does not change largely due to re-organization,
re-grouping, or takeovers and ﬁrm sales within holding companies;
4) All ﬁrms with less than 5 employees were excluded. These ﬁrms are too small to be considered
manufacturing ﬁrms.
20The wage cost exclusion criterium applies only to superlative index based estimations.
325) For superlative index based estimations observations with a labor cost share in value added
of more than 0.99 or less than 0.01, and average wage costs per employee (and year) of less than
10 Mill. Lira and more than 500 Billion Lira were also excluded. Some average wage cost data
may be ﬂawed, since there may be a mismatch between the date of reporting of employees and the
period over which wage costs are added. Also, restructuring of ﬁrms during the reporting period
may be a cause for outliers.
Finally, part-time work is not appropriately counted. Reassuringly, however, while the "clean-
ing" of the data reduces the sample by about 20% (from 209,934 to 166,550 observations) our
coeﬃcient estimates are not sensitive to the exclusion criteria.
We checked representativeness, using ISTAT census for 1996 and 1991. Unfortunately, the
industry codes of the census and of our ﬁrm database are incompatible so that we can only compare
the regional dimension. In 1996 our ﬁrm database covers 56 % of manufacturing emplyment and
its distribution across provinces calculated using our ﬁrm database or ISTAT census data is very
s i m i l a r( c o r r e l a t i o no f0 . 9 3 ) .
A.2 German ﬁrms
Firm level data are from the Amadeus 200,000 database of Bureau van Dijk. This database is
updated in real time on-line. We took data in March 2001. Bureau van Dijk eliminates all obser-
vations which are older than 5 years. We completed the dataset by using an old CD-ROM from
1999.21 The ﬁrm matching between the two dataﬁles is incomplete, because the ﬁrm identiﬁcation
code changed slightly in some cases. We have made a case by case evaluation if in doubt. We have
also run consistency checks on location information and adjusted 43 observations. All ﬁrms without
ownership information in the dataset are considered local owners. This is common practise for the
database. Ownership information is available but not in every year. We assume that ownership
status is persistent in the years previous to reporting and only changes at the year of reporting.
Foreign owned ﬁrms are ﬁrms with reported voting rights accruing to at least one ultimate foreign
owner. This typically implies a substantial (but not necessarily a majority) share of voting right
in foreign hands. For East German ﬁrms Western owners are considered as foreigners. Companies
21We thank Bocconi library for providing us with these data and Bureau van Dijk, oﬃce Milan, for giving us special
permission for the use of these data.
33of Treuhandanstalt - the East German privatization agency - are considered domestically owned.
Unconsolidated balance sheet data are used.
The same exclusion criteria that was applied to the Italian data were also applied for the
German data.22 We exclude, however, all ﬁrms with less than 20 employees (rather than 5). As the
Amadeus database excludes small ﬁrms, those with less than 20 employees are most likely holding
companies with large assets and no production workers. Even for Germany the coeﬃcient estimates
are not sensitive to changes in the exclusion criteria. Reported industry codes are US-SIC codes.
We include only manufacturing ﬁrms with US-SIC codes 20-39. All observations without US-SIC
code are eliminated. In addition, we exclude for the dynamic panel estimations all sectors with
less than 35 observations (SIC21, SIC31, SIC39) to have a reliable sector-speciﬁce s t i m a t eo ft h e
capital share used in TFP calculation.
We also investigated, in greater detail, the representativeness of our German database. Tables
and statistics relative to the comparison of our data with Bundesbank data are available from Peri
and Urban (2002). Here it is enough to note that the number of sampled ﬁrms in our database is
rather stable over years (around 900 ﬁrms sampled each year), reducing the problem of attrition.
Also, while some sectors are over-represented (such as chemicals) due to the larger average size of
their ﬁr m s ,t h ec o v a r a g eo fo u rd a t a b a s ei sc l o s et ob er e p r e s e n t a t i v ea tt h er e g i o n a ll e v e l .
B Appendix: Panel Unit-Root Tests
Coeﬃcient estimates in panels with a short and ﬁxed time dimension using the Arellano-Bond
method are inconsistent if data have a unit-root, while the Blundell-Bond estimator would have
poor small-sample properties (see Binder et al., 2003) with non-stationary data. For this reason
we perform a test of unit-root on each measure of productivity and on other variables used in the
empirical analysis. Bond et al. (2002) suggest to use the t-statistic from a simple OLS estimator
with clustered standard errors. As the estimate is consistent under the null-hypothesis of a unit
root but inconsistent under the alternative hypothesis of a stationary time series the t-statistic is
distributed as a normal under the null. Based on Monte Carlo evidence this test seems to perform
well even in the case of a short time dimension. Using this test we can reject the null hypothesis
22Nominal values of exclusion criteria are translated with an implicit exchange rate of 1 DEM equal to 1000 Lira.
34of unit roots for all variables used in our study. The values of the test statistics for each variable




Variable Name Test-Statistic Marginal Probability Test-Statistic Marginal Probability
A
sup
it 7.76 0.00 68.11.11 0.00
A
FE
it 9.00 0.00 86.71 0.00
A
OLS
it 9.07 0.00 88.56 0.00
A
LP
it 9.03 0.00 87.15 0.00
A
Front






























i,t−1 9.38 0.00 68.91 0.00
FDIdensity rst 7.37 0.00 41.36 0.00
4employmentit 20.93 0.00 146.07 0.00
Remarks: test is based on a cluster regression of xit = βxit−1 + εit. The OLS estimate βOLS is consistent
under the null hypothesis β =1 . The test statistic is simply (1−βOLS)/seOLS,w h e r eseOLS is the ﬁrm-clustered
standard error of βOLS. This test-stastistic has an asymptotic standard normal distribution. Marginal probability
is the probability under which the Ho cannot be rejected.
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